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Abstract1
This paper reflects on the issues that were brought 
to the Roundtable on Hermeneutics and Translo-
cality held at the ZMO in 2006. I review the suc-
cessive ways in which I have drawn on the herme-
neutic philosophical tradition as an anthropologist, 
emphasing the ethical dimension. Translocality 
heightens the hermeneutic problem but does not 
radically change it; it may entail recognizing that 
everything is always already pretranslated. In re-
flecting on the task and means of anthropology, I 
briefly juxtapose Gadamer’s admirable deference 
or modesty to Ricoeur’s dialectic of appropriation 
and distanciation and to what Cavell calls the arro-
gation of voice.
Hermeneutics and translocality
It is with a certain lack of confidence that I write 
in Germany about hermeneutics. Germany is the 
country in which hermeneutics has been most rich-
ly developed and debated and many of you undoub-
tedly know much more about the tradition than I. I 
am not a philosopher and have read none of the ma-
jor works or authors of this tradition in any depth, 
and what I have read was some years ago. My goal, 
then, is not to offer an academic paper within this 
philosophical tradition, to further develop or cri-
tique it, but rather, to draw from it, to consider 
something of what it might offer to anthropology. 
I draw on hermeneutics for three related reasons. 
First, I think it offers a good and close analogy of 
ethnographic practice and hence an interesting de-
1 This paper was written at the invitation of Kai Kresse and 
presented at the Roundtable on Hermeneutics and Translo-
cality at the ZMO, Berlin, in September 2006. It has been 
very slightly updated for publication 5 years later.
scription of the anthropological project. Second, it 
provides hints on how to refine and improve that 
practice, possibly even a kind of »best practice« 
model for ethnography. Sometimes, however, it 
is the informed critique of hermeneutics that of-
fers the analogy or the improvement (Crapanzano 
1992). Third and most important, hermeneutics ex-
tends our comprehension of the human condition 
and hence of anthropological theorizing. Specifi-
cally, it directs us to non-reductive understandings 
of cultural phenomena and social practices. I call 
the third reason the most important because, while 
hermeneutics has made us more reflective about 
our own status and limits as cultural interpreters, 
in the end it is a deeper and broader understanding 
of social life, cultural worlds, and the human condi-
tion that constitutes the object of anthropological 
knowledge.
My acquaintance with hermeneutics has been 
gradual but relatively continuous, ever since I dis-
covered in reading Clifford Geertz the possibility 
of finding my voice in anthropology.2 In my first 
book, Human Spirits: A Cultural Account of Trance 
in Mayotte (1981), I began by drawing on Ricoeur 
(1971) and applying the text metaphor to the inter-
pretation of spirit possession on the island of Mayot-
te. I tried to follow more or less Ricoeur’s account 
in Interpretation Theory (1976) of a structuralist 
hermeneutics, moving from first understanding, 
through a structuralist decoding, toward a fuller 
comprehension. In my second book, Knowledge 
and Practice in Mayotte: Local Discourses of Islam, 
Sorcery, and Spirit Possession (1993), I drew some-
what on Gadamer (1985) and specifically the ideas 
of a tradition as an ongoing conversation and of 
2 This is a kind of paraphrase of Stanley Cavell’s discovery 
of his voice through listening to John Austin (Cavell 1994).
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nary as a feature of modernity and the bourgeoisie 
– a value to be contrasted to previous aristocratic 
or feudal values – one can see the »ordinary« as 
central to all times and places, in contrast to the 
metaphysical, etc. A question that arises is how the 
acceptance and acknowledgement – in a word, the 
commitment – entailed in taking up an action or 
performing a ritual articulates with the continuous 
judgment and exercise of the virtues necessary for 
or simply characteristic of ongoing social interac-
tion. This is an ethical question, but also one that 
will surely play out differently in distinct social and 
cultural milieux and that may become especially 
problematic when translocality is pronounced. 
My prior ethnographic encounters are relevant 
here insofar as I have been inspired to think about 
the ethics of action and, more specifically, to follow 
Stanley Cavell, about how we acknowledge acts as 
ours, in part by the genre of spirit possession and 
the practices and acts of specific spirit mediums 
and other healers. In other words, the ethnographic 
and hermeneutic encounter with spirit possession 
has pushed me to pursue certain questions of phi-
losophy (Lambek 1998, 2003). I take this as an in-
stance of what might be meant more broadly by the 
productive conversation between distinct cultural 
traditions.
The Aristotelian/hermeneutic tradition may be 
faulted for being excessively optimistic or idea-
listic (and, as taken up in modern philosophy and 
anthropology, overly romantic). Not only does it 
not generally overcome, or perhaps even seriously 
consider, the severe differences of power, status, 
and capacity characteristic of the present world, 
but it needs to incorporate, as Bruce Janz (2009) 
and the African philosophers like Achille Mbembe 
(2001) he cites note, both a recognition of violence 
and what Ricoeur memorably called the hermeneu-
tics of suspicion. In the confessional essay I circu-
lated to the Roundtable (Lambek 1997), I depicted 
a kind of Freudian or Freud-inspired hermeneutics 
of suspicion of the hermeneutic encounter itself, 
in which human passions, such as anxiety, ambi-
valence, competitiveness, and idealization, no less 
than locally and translocally construed fields of 
power, have their part even in the mutual desire 
for understanding. There are dialogical encoun-
ters constituted by a tension between affinity and 
the anxieties of influence, in which transference 
and counter-transference must surely play their 
part and in which participants may be speaking at 
cross-purposes or at least not to the reciprocal ide-
al Gadamer desires. But the reason I pre-circulated 
that paper was mainly that it speaks to the kind of 
uneasiness about locality – about place and space, 
to take the terms Janz borrows from Mudimbe, who 
borrows them from de Certeau – that is emblema-
tic of the postmodern era and that is figured in the 
concept of translocality as articulated by Bromber 
and Hamzah (2005). Translocality is, in the first in-
understanding as grounded in conversation. Thus 
I portray inhabitants of Mayotte working within 
specific traditions of knowledge and the ongoing 
conversation among these traditions as it emerges 
in the diverse practices of people acting, variously, 
from the perspectives of Schutzian experts, well-
informed citizens, and ordinary people on the path 
(Schutz 1964). (This dimension of the perspective or 
intention of the knower to his or her knowledge or 
action is important and generally neglected.) I also 
show the growth of my own understanding through 
conversation, specifically through the possibilities 
and constraints of being a student in conversation 
with practitioners about their specific actions and, 
to draw from the Manchester school (Evens and 
Handelman 2006), about and within specific cases.
By the time of my third book, The Weight of the 
Past: Living with History in Mahajanga, Madagas-
car (2002), I had understood that the hermeneutic 
tradition begins with Aristotle. I drew upon two of 
Aristotle’s categories of human action, namely poi-
esis, or (creative) making, and phronesis, or (judi-
cious) doing (practice). There is a third Aristotelian 
category, namely theoria, or contemplative reason, 
which I did not specifically address there but which 
I take to be the substance of what Kai Kresse me-
ans when he talks about an anthropology of philo-
sophy (Kresse 2007). I think that poiesis, phronesis, 
and contemplative thought are closely intertwined, 
more dimensions or aspects of human engagement 
with the world than discrete kinds of activity. Thus 
the terms are abstractions from, or interpretations 
of, more holistic human activity, being in the world. 
Nevertheless, they do become objectified in speci-
fic cultural practices, genres, theories, and discipli-
nes, such as academic philosophy itself. In any case, 
they clarify the alternative to reductionism. We 
can understand them in terms of what C. B. Mac-
pherson (1973) called the human capacities, rather 
than utilities. This is to accept and expand Sahlins’ 
(1976) opposition between culture and structure 
and what he calls (unfortunately) practical reason. 
Human beings exercise their capacities for crea-
tivity, ethical practice, and reasoning – they don’t 
simply need, desire, calculate, compete, conquer, 
expropriate, submit, resist, etc.
Latterly I have begun to consider how the sort of 
Aristotelian picture developed by Hannah Arendt in 
The Human Condition (1958), namely a picture that 
includes labor, distinguished from creative work 
or poiesis, and that highlights action rather than 
practice, might help round out an anthropological 
view, or at least my view. With partial reference to 
hermeneutics, but at least equally to so-called or-
dinary language philosophy, I have been thinking 
about how to conceptualize human action, not only 
the heroic or historically significant acts that the 
Greeks, Marx, and Arendt variously valorize, but 
everyday acts, like promising or winking (Lambek 
2010). Whereas Charles Taylor (1989) sees the ordi-
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ropolitan France. This is different from Tanzanian 
youth performing hip-hop in Tanzania (Weiss 2009), 
where the genre is translocal, but where, in a literal 
sense, the performers are not.
Second, translocality entails recognizing that 
an older portrait of hermeneutics as the meeting 
of autonomous traditions, as a confrontation bet-
ween genuinely distant or absolutely foreign texts, 
must be supplanted by one of encountering what 
is always already encountered. The danger here is 
no longer exoticism or relativism, but the assump-
tion that we already understand one another, that 
a common location or a common language implies a 
common or identical lived world, that our horizons 
coincide more closely than they do.
As Adam Ashforth reflects as he struggles to 
represent the discrepancies between what he and 
his South African subject, Madumo, understand 
by »witchcraft«, the problem is increasingly that 
»the terms we use are already translated from one 
language and culture to another and back again, 
over and over through generations. There is no 
pristine vocabulary of difference available to Ma-
dumo to describe his experiences with witchcraft 
that I could translate and then present to the world 
in terms familiar to the West; no language to make 
the words seem unique, or the effort of translation 
worthwhile. The words, like the worlds, are already 
pre-translated. And yet, there remains something 
radically and irreducibly different in his experience 
of these matters from mine...« (2000: 244).
Third, insofar as translocal parts no longer con-
join to form distinct wholes, the hermeneutic circle 
of part/whole relations is no longer self-evident. If 
the whole is something emergent and as yet unfor-
med, then the part must be contingent; adjacent 
practices may have little relation to one another. 
On the other hand, if hermeneutics no longer com-
prehends part/whole relations directly, it must in-
clude comparison of performances or meanings in 
different locations. These then become the parts of 
some larger, as yet ungrasped, emergent or contes-
ted translocal »whole«, a whole that is so encom-
passing (is it »modernity«, is it the mind?) that it 
evades well-rounded comprehension.
Of course, the anthropological hermeneutic stand-
point has always been at least partially translocal 
insofar as we sought insider perspectives without 
giving up our position as outsiders; we tried, first, 
for a kind of bilingual, bicultural understanding on 
the spot and, second, to mediate between the two 
languages or cultures on our return home. What is 
relatively new is the translocal position of our sub-
jects or in some instances simply our recognition 
of their translocal or transcultural position (which 
was in many instances formed under colonialism 
and its aftermath). Hence the question becomes 
our interpretation of their context and practice of 
interpretation: our hermeneutic of their herme-
neutic. Yet in Knowledge and Practice I pointed out 
stance, experienced and articulated by ourselves 
as intellectuals or philosophers, in Kresse’s sense, 
and in the very possibility that Mudimbe can read 
de Certeau while Janz can read Mudimbe, and I can 
receive electronically from Germany Janz’s essay, 
written, perhaps, in Florida, and then travel myself 
to speak about it in Berlin. 
The challenge for us, the hermeneutic challen-
ge if you will, is multi-faceted. First, and progres-
sively, it is not to generalize from our own, privi-
leged experience of translocality to that of others 
engaged in other, more constrained and exploitati-
ve spheres of circulation. For example, my situation 
is not equivalent to that of the African intellectuals 
given voice in Bruce Janz’s text, whose knowledge 
was forged in a colonial and post-colonial context 
that, one could say, is by its very nature, translo-
cal (e.g., through religious education).  Second, and 
conservatively, the challenge is to consider how to 
balance the evident intellectual benefits of translo-
cality with the healthy reproduction of traditions, 
i.e., how to resist that simultaneous flattening of 
place and time and intensification of movement 
that we experience everywhere. For both these re-
asons, I appreciate Bromber and Hamzah’s singling 
out of excess. But third, the novelty of translocality 
should not be exaggerated any more than the poly-
phony of tradition should be overlooked. In Know-
ledge and Practice I tried to illustrate a polyphony 
of traditions consequent to regional translocality 
outside the Euro-American sphere and outside (in 
at least some readings of the term) »modernity«. 
In The Weight of the Past, I downplay it somewhat, 
but translocality is evident in such incidents as an 
encounter with a Saudi supplicant at the ancestral 
shrine in Mahajanga and polyphony in the conti-
nuing and complex articulation of ancestral tra-
dition with Islam and with European modernity, a 
historical polyphony that I call a poiesis of history. 
The historical depth of this regional Indian Ocean 
translocality is something whose nature members 
of the ZMO have considerably explored. 
Translocality in the anthropological vocabulary sig-
nifies that we are no longer trying to discern whole 
or bounded cultures, but traveling and interming-
ling repertoires. This has a number of implications, 
of which I will mention three.
First, contrary to what my circulated article 
may have implied, insofar as hermeneutics is not 
about understanding other people, qua psychologi-
cal individuals, it is less relevant whether persons 
are mobile or translocal than that practices, gen-
res, texts, discourses, and prejudices are. Writing, 
I would say, is an intrinsically translocal medium, 
as are successive innovations in the technology of 
communication. Of course, mobile persons often 
are the vehicles for translocal practices, for examp-
le where people from Mayotte perform Maulidas or 
spirit possession ceremonies in La Réunion or met-
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subject of anthropology is found less in individua-
ted or abstracted theories than in collective tradi-
tions, worlds of thought and practice. In Gadame-
rian terms, what we are interested in are horizons 
of prejudice. And the goal is one of understanding 
the world of our informants (a word that sudden-
ly seems more accurate than interlocutors) rather 
than of agreement or disputation, as must occur in 
serious conversation or academic philosophy. 
I used to think (1991) that anthropology entailed 
following Gadamer’s fine maxim:  
Hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not 
as an absolute position but as a way of experi-
ence. It insists that there is no higher princip-
le than holding oneself open in a conversation. 
But this means: Always recognize in advance the 
possible correctness, even the superiority of the 
conversation partner’s position. Is this too litt-
le? Indeed, this seems to be the kind of integrity 
one can demand only of a professor of philosophy. 
And one should demand as much. (1985 [1977]: 
189).
I now think that Ricoeur’s dialectic of appropria-
tion and »distanciation« better fits the picture. Un-
less we want to go native, so to speak, to argue as 
and with one of them, we do preserve some distance 
and therefore we stay at a remove from Gadamer’s 
standard of serious responsiveness. Put another 
way, insofar as deep understanding remains within 
a certain frame of conversation, or fieldwork, as we 
move outside that frame, and intend to do so from 
the start, the integrity is compromised.
It is not a matter of whether specific persons we 
encounter in the field are or are not philosophers, 
but whether anthropology wishes to see them first 
through this lens rather than through another. If 
we take our research subjects seriously as philoso-
phers, and ourselves too, then our job would be to 
debate them or to further promote, codify, or deve-
lop their ideas, as do the students, successors, and 
posthumous editors of Wittgenstein or Foucault. 
The anthropological conversation, as I understand 
and assumptions that underlie them, part of a tradition that, 
as I currently see it, has roots in Renaissance hermeticism. 
A second dimension of this research must have to do with 
the historical careers of competing traditions and specifi-
cally the way healing practices are increasingly colonized 
by state and other discursive processes of rationalization, 
regulation, and control (e.g. medical, insurance, and trade 
regimes), but, equally, constituted precisely in and through 
their resistance to such processes or at least the way they 
come to symbolize such resistance. But there is another in-
terest, somewhat closer to philosophy, and certainly to her-
meneutics, in the creativity and ethical character and acts 
of specific practitioners. 
that hermeneutic practice in Mayotte was already 
one of juggling among incommensurable traditions; 
and indeed that »culture« itself – that is any sing-
le given tradition – is constituted in part from in-
commensurables, and thus that the hermeneutic 
problem, or rather hermeneutic practice, must be 
intrinsic to culture (much as, for Gadamer, it oc-
curs within a single tradition). Therefore, the pro-
blem or practice of interpretation between cultu-
res or traditions is not a radical departure from the 
problem or practice of interpretation within them 
or within or between places. Similarly, the trans-
locality of one’s own cultural building blocks is not 
new or special. The ongoing work of interpretation 
is what culture is.
Thus, for anthropology, the hermeneutic who-
le has always been something of an idealized 
fiction. And it must be so for literary hermeneu-
tics as well, insofar as, to cite Jonathan Culler’s 
aphorism, »meaning is context-bound but context 
is boundless« (1982). Incidentally, the metaphor of 
culture as text was never about cultures as fixed, 
bounded objects (»texts«), but of »text-building« 
(Becker 1979).
If time permits I would like to further contrast 
the relations of anthropology, broadly conceived, 
to the work of intercultural philosophy or even to 
what Kresse calls the anthropology of philosophy 
or what Armin Geertz (2003) refers to as »ethno-
hermeneutics«.
As I noted above, contemplation should be seen 
in Aristotelian conjunction with poiesis and phrone-
sis rather than, in Plato’s terms, in opposition and 
superior to them and hence independent of them. My 
fieldwork has not entailed seeking out so-called sa-
ges or African equivalents to Western philosophers, 
though I have certainly gravitated to exemplary in-
dividuals and teachers. I have worked primarily by 
means of intense conversations within contexts of 
observed practice and the intention has been not 
so much to discover explicit philosophies as to un-
cover the underlying tradition and the repertoire of 
practices, the background of »prejudice« from which 
explicit ideas, creative projects, and practical judg-
ments emerge. As hermeneutics is sometimes identi-
fied with dialogue, it is worth reflecting on Ricoeur’s 
remark that, »Hermeneutics begins where dialogue 
ends« (1976: 32).3 As distinct from philosophy, the 
3  In the work that I have begun in Switzerland, many prac-
titioners wish nothing more than to give me an explicit ren-
dition of some argument; such rationalization is quite dif-
ferent from my experience among Malagasy speakers on 
the island of Mayotte and in Madagascar. But the theories 
behind the arguments are either fairly inchoate or else pre-
packaged and my interest is less in listing them or respond-
ing to them individually, rehearsing, if you like, the various 
injunctions of homeopathy or alchemy (spagyric), than in 
unpacking the contextual relations and the set of concepts 
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ding of the other occurs by means of a double move 
of contextualizing the foreign text in its tradition 
while simultaneously engaging in a hermeneutic 
interrogation of one’s own tradition to find words 
and concepts rich and subtle enough to articulate 
the new. It is through this painstaking method that 
we achieve, if we do, what Gadamer calls a fusion 
of horizons between the conversation partners, or 
at least, from the perspective of the anthropolo-
gist alone, Ricoeur’s dialectic of distanciation and 
appropriation.
To contextualize entails understanding what the 
other is saying and doing, and this understanding 
begins through conversation. But this is conver-
sation of a particular and uneven kind (Crapan-
zano 1992), in which the anthropologist defers to 
the speech of the subject (while the subject may 
be less interested in the speech of the anthropo-
logist). Listening to others in this fashion entails 
deference. It behooves what I have called the shift 
From Method to Modesty (1991) and that I take to 
summarize one of Gadamer’s key contributions, as 
the citation above indicates. But I would add now 
that modesty is perhaps only half the picture. It 
goes along with what Stanley Cavell (1994) calls 
»the arrogation of voice«. Arrogation means undue 
claim; arrogation is closely related to arrogance. 
The arrogance of the anthropologist is threefold: 
First, to have the temerity to displace or precede 
the voice of the other. Second, to practice an inter-
nal structural analysis and an external hermeneu-
tics of suspicion on the speech or text produced by 
other voices and actors. And third, and this like 
philosophy, the arrogation to act as the voice of 
humanity, to speak as one who has seen and done 
much outside home or the ordinary and who can 
thereby abstract from ordinary or local experience 
or generalize from more than one case, who can 
draw on the history of comparison, generalization, 
abstraction, argument, and empirical documenta-
tion that constitutes the anthropological (or philo-
sophical) tradition, who can speak, if you like, as 
the exemplary voice of enlightened, cosmopolitan 
translocality. Whatever its pretensions, however, 
the translocality of the anthropological tradition 
remains a »trans« of »across«, not a »trans« of 
»above« or »beyond«; it too is a product of horizon 
clearing, an extending rather than a transcending.
With regard to the first arrogation, represen-
ting the voice of the other, caution is certainly in 
order, and ethical judgment, but in the end, what 
else can we do but acknowledge our act? So-called 
»collaborative anthropology« is a nice idea but it is 
usually riddled with problems and self-deceptions 
of its own. Either our collaborators become anth-
ropologists, in which case they too are engaged 
in arrogating voices, or they remain de facto our 
subjects, their voices arrogated – and the more so 
to the degree we refuse to acknowledge the situa-
and practice it, is not primarily one of debate with 
or fully joining in with our subjects, though there 
are increasing challenges and invitations to do so 
and this is perhaps one of the effects of transloca-
lity. To re-metaphorize Geertz’s image of reading 
over the shoulders of our subjects, it is as though 
we elicit or overhear conversation rather than ta-
king a full role in it. I hope this is not a »denial of 
coevalness« (see Fabian 1983) but an ethical bra-
cketing of practices.4 And as I indicated, this does 
not preclude a certain kind of influence on our out-
look, orientation, and theories as anthropologists 
(or more simply, as persons).
Of course, anthropologists of all kinds of topics 
and not merely of philosophy do sometimes pro-
gress by means of portraits of exemplary and ordi-
nary individuals and I have found myself doing so. 
But whereas the philosopher strives to decontex-
tualize the ideas, so as to universalize them, the 
anthropologist’s task is one of contextualization. 
Alton Becker long ago elaborated a minimum of 
four kinds of contextual relations that have to be 
described when studying a text, relations he called 
coherence, invention, intentionality, and reference 
(1979). Coherence refers to the relations of units 
within a text; invention to the relations of a text 
to other texts, particularly those in the same gen-
re; intentionality to the relations of creators and 
audience of the text; and reference to relations 
to nonliterary events outside the text (cf. Lambek 
1981: 8).5 Becker deployed the text metaphor to 
approach text-building performances of Javanese 
shadow puppetry; I extended it to performances of 
spirit possession in Mayotte, but I think his elabo-
ration of contextual constraints and relations could 
be applied more broadly to a variety of practices 
and genres and, indeed, to the ordinary acts and 
utterances of persons. In contextualizing a conver-
sation, then, one would like to explore and com-
pare these sets of relations as they pertain, diffe-
rentially, to each party. I would add that the act of 
translating the sense of the text, fully comprehen-
ding it, entails exploring also the repertoire of phi-
losophical, ethical, and aesthetic concepts offered 
by the anthropologist’s or translator’s own tradi-
tion or by the tradition of the intended reader, in 
addition to the tradition of the author or the world 
of the text itself. This is necessary in order to do 
justice to the text and performance, to mirror its 
complexity with a translation (or interpretation) of 
equivalent force and quality. Thus the understan-
4 It should also be clear that the relationship of anthropolo-
gist to informant holds, no matter where each of them lives 
or comes from.
5 Behind this lies Roman Jakobson’s distinction (1960) 
among speaker, hearer, message, code, contact, and context 
– referring, respectively, to the emotive, conative, poetic, 
meta-linguistic, phatic, and referential functions of commu-
nication. 
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cluding paragraphs of Interpretation Theory, where 
he reviews three misconceptions in Romanticist 
hermeneutics’ conceptualization of appropriation. 
What is to be understood and appropriated, affirms 
Ricoeur, is not the intention of the author of the 
text, nor the understanding of the original addres-
see, nor yet the understanding of any given reader.
What has to be appropriated is the meaning of the 
text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the di-
rection of thought opened up by the text. In other 
words, what has to be appropriated is nothing 
other than the power of disclosing a world that 
constitutes the reference of the text. In this way 
we are as far from the Romanticist ideal [an ideal 
that continues to remain a lure today] of coinci-
ding with a foreign psyche. If we may be said to 
coincide with anything, it is not the inner life of 
another ego, but the disclosure of a possible way 
of looking at things, which is the genuine referen-
tial power of the text. (Ricoeur 1976: 92) 
The job of the reader is not to project herself into 
the text, to reduce it to the limitations of her under-
standing. »The reader rather is enlarged in his ca-
pacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of 
being from the text itself. Appropriation, in this way, 
ceases to appear as a kind of possession, as a way of 
taking hold of things; instead it implies a moment of 
dispossession of the egoistic and narcissistic ego… 
In this self-understanding, I would oppose the self, 
which proceeds from the understanding of the text, 
to the ego, which claims to precede it. It is the text, 
with its universal power of world disclosure, which 
gives a self to the ego« (Ricoeur 1976: 94-5).
In other words (and to inflate the point), inter-
pretation is less an act in which the interpreter re-
mains in control than a kind of passion in which we 
submit to the power of the text, are opened up by 
it. It is less possession of the text than possession 
by it (hence, rather like spirit possession itself). As 
Stanley Cavell might say, it is the text that reads us. 
Interpretation expands the potential of the text (or 
the world of the text) rather than closing it down 
or reducing it to some fixed meaning, content, or 
structure. Of course, this too is but an ideal (in the 
sense both of ideal type and ideal goal), rather ab-
stracted from dialogue and struggle, and perhaps 
an indication of a kind of privileged space of pro-
tection within which the text can do its work.
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